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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
There exists in Kentucky a procedural device which deserves
critical analysis due to the injustice which it makes possible. The mat-
ter in question is Kentucky s brand of temporary restralmng order;'
the possibilities of injustice are numerous.
Kentucky has a very loose procedure for the issuance of temporary
restraining orders. The code provides that "If it appear from the
petition that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, a
temporary injunction may be granted to restrain 2 any act nor-
mally susceptible to the jurisdiction of equity There is no requirement
of notice to the adverse party if the court is" satisfied by the facts
set forth in the affidavit of the applicant, or by other evidence, that irre-
parable injury will result to the applicant from the delay of giving no-
tice "3 Two potential possibilities of oppression available to
harass unfortunate parties by the weight of an injunction are thus
apparent. The first: one may find himself subjected to injunctive re-
straint, the application for which he was completely without knowl-
edge. The second: the code provides no guaranty of truth in the
search for facts upon which to base such a temporary restraining order.
Ex parte proceedings are a form of procedure which have never
been favored by the law No legal principle could be more funda-
mental than that every litigant should receive notice that an action is
pending against hin and have opportunity to make an appearance
prior to his subjection to a judgment of law or equity Pursuant to
the rule of the Kentucky Code, the applicant for a temporary re-
straining order may dispense with any requirement of notice by satis-
fying the judge that he will suffer irreparable injury by the delay
necessitated by the giving of notice. The applicant may show this "by
evidence" 4 not even being compelled to produce it in affidavit form.
Presumedly, the "evidence" sufficient to establish the point could be
the bare statement or complaint of the applicant himself. The estab-
lishment of jurisdictional grounds, a prerequisite to any action of
equity also receives cursory treatment in the procedure. In order to
accomplish this, it need only" appear from the petition that the
2 11 Injunctive writs are of three general classes: first, the temporary
restraining order or injunction ad interim, winch m the ordinary course issues cx
parte, without notice or hearing; second, the temporary injunction or injunction
pendente lite, issuing after notice and opportunity to be heard; third, the perma-
nent injunction, based on a full heanng and enforcing the final decision on the
merits. FANKFrTEa AND GREENE, TnE LABOR INJUNCTIoN 5,3 (1930); MC
CRACKEN, STnE INJuNciONs IN THE NEW SoUTH 7 (1931).
Ky. CODE: Civ. Pnoc. ANN. sec. 272 (Carroll's 1948).
3 Id. at 276.4 Ibid.
NOTES AND COMIMIENTS
plantiff is entitled to the relief demanded .,"5 and from affidavits or
other evidence that he is about to suffer irreparable injury 6 There is
no requirement for any sort of hearing; the entire procedure can be
transacted on paper. The life of an order thus granted is a variable
which cannot exceed twenty days.7
The legal principle behind any sort of injunctive relief without
notice is the belief that equity, the gloss of the law, should afford
relief to one who is faced with imediate irreparable injury when sub-
sequent damages would not compensate for the injury sustained.
That there is merit in the tenet cannot be demed. It, however, as is the
case throughout the field of jurisprudence, has its confines beyond
which it becomes generosity to the plaintiff, rather than redress, and
oppression to the defendant, rather than impartial adjudication. The
balance is tripped in the name of speed. When one comes to equity in
quest of injunctive relief equipped with allegations that he about to
suffer great harm for which an a'tion for damages will not adequately
compensate, and that even a normal injunction on the merits of the
cause will be too late to save him. from his doom, it is the natural
impulse for everyone to agree that he should have it. Speed, the
master of modern society, refuses to be ignored by the courts. Sober
reflection reveals, however, that speed in numerous instances is not
worth the toll it exacts from accuracy This trmsm is axiomatic in -the
field of adjudication.-"
The injustices engineered by the accessibility of immediate re-
straining orders against defendants not present, indeed, even without
notice, are numerous. Kentucky, fortunately, has not been plagued by
evils brought on by abuse of the injunctive powers of the courts.
Other jurisdictions have not been receptive of such good fortune."
Ibid.
Supra, Note 2.
The Kentucky Code provides; "'The restrmmng order, if made by the court,
or an' circuit or other judge of similar jurisdiction, shall set forth a reasonable
place and time, not to exceed ten days from the day upon which the order is made,
at which the applicant shall move the court or judge to grant the injunction; and
the order shall remain in force until the motion is heard and determined, but not
for a greater length of time than ten days after the day fixed in the order for
hearing the application." Ky. CODE CIv. Proc. ANN. sec. 273 (Carroll's 1948).
In Hopkins v. Oxley Stone Co., 83 Fed. 912, 925, Caldwell, J., in a dis-
senting opinion, referring to an argument on behalf of the injunction as a means
of admimstenng the criminal law, used language which is applicable to the argu-
mient for speed in the issuance of temporary restraimng orders; "Those who justify
or excuse mob law do it on the ground that admimstration of cnnmnal justice in
the courts is slow and expensive and the results sometimes unsatisfactory." See
abo note, 41 HAnv. L. REv. 909 (1928).
"Defects in court procedure seldom find a place in a President's message to
Congress upon 'the state of the Uion. But the abuses we have here described
were flagrant enough for such attention. In a message to Congress in, 1909, Presi-
dent Taft proposed- a statute forbidding hereafter the issuing of any injunction
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These are chiefly the industrial states where agitation for the reform
of the injunction has, for the most part, risen out of injunction cases
involving organized labor.
To the organized worker, the injunction constitutes the principal
barrier to any right connected with union activities that he may
possess. The effect of judicial interference with a strike, from the
point of view of the laborer, is well illustrated by the quotation from
testimony given by a striker before the United States Strike Commis-
sion and quoted by the court in In Re Debs:
"As soon as the employes found that we were arrested, and
taken from the scene of action, they became demoralized, and that
ended the strike. It was not the soldiers that ended the strike. It was
not the old brotherhoods that ended the strike. It was simply the
United States courts that ended the strike. Our men were in a posi-
tion that never would have been shaken, under any circumstance, if
we had been permitted to remain upon the field among them. Once
we were taken from the scene of action, and restrained from sending
telegrams or issuing orders or answering questions, then the marons
of the corporations would be put to work. Our headquarters were
temporarily demoralized and abandoned, and we could not answer
any messages. The men went back to work, and the ranks were
broken and the strike was broken up, not by the army, and not
by any other power, but simply and solely by the action of the United
States courts in restraining us from discharging our duties as officers
and representatives of our employes."'"
There can be no doubt that an injunction can destroy a strike, and
its force can as well be the downfall of a boycott carried on in the
spirit of the law as one accompanied by illegal acts. The pressing
issues of the substantive law of injunction are beyond the scope of
this paper, but it is believed that there is justifiable quarrel, especially
on the part of organized labor, with the speed with which temporary
restraining orders often issue and with the flimsy evidence upon which
the writ is often based.
or restraining order, whether temporary or permanent, by an Federal court, with-
out previous notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on behalf of the
parties to be enjoined; unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that
the delay necessary to give such notice and hearing would result in irreparable
injury to the complainant and unless also the court shall from the evidence make
a written finding, which shall be spread upon the court mnnutes, that immediate
and rreparable injury is likely to ensue to the complainant, and shall define the
injury, state why it is irreparable, and shall also endorse on the order issued the
date and the hour of the issuance of the order. Moreover, every such injunction
or restraining order issued without previous notice or opportunity by the defendant
to be heard should by force of the statute expire and be of no effect after seven
days from the issuance thereof unless within such seven days or such less
period, the injunction or order is extended or renewed after previous notice and
opportunity to be heard. " FRANKFuRTm AND GREENE, Tin LABoR INJUNCTiON 65
(1930).0158 U.S. 564, 597 (1910).
NoTEs .' COmmENTS
The issuance of any injunction depends upon questions of fact, the
accepted mode of proof being the affidavit. It has been pointed out
that the Kentucky Code provides not even tihs minimum of truth
assurance.' In labor cases particularly, counsel who prepare the affi-
davits and the affiants themselves are so engrossed in the struggle and
so anxious to present their side of the case in as favorable a light as
possible that their finshed product is such a highly colored, exag-
gerated statement as to be "an incantation, and not a rational solicita-
tion for judgment."12 The erroneous issuance of a restraining order,
to which such affidavits are highly conducive, may be drastic, indeed
disastrous, in labor cases.13 The writ is, in most instances, sufficient to
break a strike, and the usual code provision' - requiring bond prior to
the exercise of the device is in most cases far from compensatory to a
labor organization for the loss incurred, resulting from the effects of
an injunction on a strike.i 5 A hearing on the merits or an appeal from
the issuance of a temporary restraining order involves time. Days are
precious in an industrial conflict; the lapse of time leading to a
hearing on the merits may well be all that is needed by an employer
to break a strike.' 6 It is apparent that when a labor organization is
restrained by a temporary restraining order of which it had no notice,
the injunction is very likely to be based on erroneous findings of fact
(since only one party has appeared before the court), and that there
is no remedy available to the organization to extract itself from the
inequities of the position in which it has been placed. It seems, there-
fore, that there are legitimate objections to any exercise of injunctive
powers without notice and opportunity to defend on the part of the
enjoined party He should have notice for the purpose of furnishing
the court with an adverse litigant, a sine qua non for establishing true
issue of fact. Moreover, situations where there is justification for
waiver of requirement of notice are difficult of conception. One comes
to equity complaining of irreparable injury which necessarily must be
injurv inflicted by human hands in labor disputes. Why cannot notice
be served on the identical person who is to be enjoined? It is sub-
"Supra note 2.
"The most serious complaint that can be made against injunctions, which
have become so promnnent a part of the law in dealing with strikes in the United
States, is the fact that courts have become accustomed to decide the most im-
portant questions of fact, often involving the citizen s liberty upon this wholly
untrustworthy class of proof." Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414,
416 (1923).
' Supra note 10.
" The Kentucky Code has the normal provision for the posting of bond by an
applicant for a temporary restraining order. Ky. CODE Civ. Paoc. ANN. sec. 276
Carroll's 1948).
See FRFY, THE LABOn INjuNcriox 85 (1922).
Fn.iKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 53 et. seq. (1930).
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mitted that there is no valid answer to this question short of provisions
for notice.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially more
specific in their requirements for the issuance of restraining orders.
Rule 65 (a) provides that "No preliminary injunction shall be issued
without notice to the adverse party" Notice is also the key word in
65 (b) wich is concerned with temporary restraining orders. The
provision is that:
"No temporary restraining order shall be granted without
notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts
shown by affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and ir-
reparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before
notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. Every temporary
restraining order granted without notice shall define the injury
and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted with-
out notice; and shall expire by its terms within such time after entry,
not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes. On 2 days notice to the
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or
on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the
adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification
and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such
motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require."
The Federal Rules provide indispensable safeguards which are not
present m the Kentucky Code against the misuse of the temporary
restraining order. From a reading of Rule 65 it is manifest that few
temporary restraining orders will be granted m federal court where
there has been absence of notice to the adverse litigant. The threat
of immediate irreparable injury must be shown by "specific facts" in
the affidavit or verified complaint. The term "specific facts" affords
much more protection of truth than merely "facts set forth in the affi-
-davit of the applicant, or by other evidence"17 which are the guides
furnished by the Kentucky Code.is Furthermore, m federal procedure,
I- Supra note 3.
", The Code also sets up an elaborate line of succession as to who may issue
a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction. It provides that such
injunctions may be granted by " any circuit judge, or by the clerk of the
court, or the county judge if the judge of the court be absent from the county, or
by two justices of the peace, if the judge and the clerk of the court and the county
judge be absent from the county. " Ky. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. see. 273 (Car-
rol's 1948); The wisdom of a provision confering anything less than absolute
junsdiction on judges of the circuit courts in these cases is lughlv arguable.
Temporary restraining orders and injunctions pendente lite are serious business
indeed. Almost complete absence of similar provisions in other jurisdictions is
indicative of a strong belief that judges of circuit level alone should handle these
procedures. The following states have no provision for anyone othern than )udges
to have jurisdiction for the issuance of temporary restraining orders and injunctions
pendente lite: Alabama, ALA. CODE ANN. Tit. 7, sec. 1038 (1940); Arizona, 2 Aiuz.
CODE ANN. see. 21-1605 (1939); Arkansas, except that county judge can grant in
the absence of the circuit judge, 3 AnK. STAT. ANN. sec. 32-104 (1947); California,
CAL. CODE OF Civ. PRoc. ANN. see. 527 (Deering 1949); Colorado, COLO. STAT.
NoTEs ANm CosIENT-rs
the reasons for the issuance without notice must be incorporated into
the order itself. Judges are apt to be more cautious in the determina-
tion of issues of fact when the conclusion must be inserted in the
order.
The Rules also supply provisions designed to enable one who finds
himself unjustifiably enjoined without notice to salvage as many of
his rights as possible. He may go to the judge immediately with his
side of the story, and" in that event the court shall proceed to hear
and determine " his motion for dissolution "as expeditiously
as the ends of justice require."19 There is no comparable provision in
the Kentucky Code; the order expires only after the passage of time
or the applicant's defeat in a hearing on the merits. The Kentucky
version falls down chiefly because of its mechanical treatment of a
highly flexible matter.
The federal procedure for temporary restraining orders constitutes
a considerably more adequate safeguard of the rights of an absent
defendant than that furnished by the Kentucky Code. It was not be-
lieved, however, that even the more specific federal rule was sufficient
effectively to combat possibilities of injustice in labor cases, for cases
involving labor disputes do not come within the application of Rule 65.
Section (e) of the rule specifies that "These rules do not modify any
statute of the United States relating to temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions in actions affecting employer and em-
ployee. " This leaves the pertinent provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act intact. 0 This statute further narrows the possibilities
of temporary restraining orders without notice to the defendant in
labor cases by providing that such an order-
may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if
sustained, to justify the court m issuing a temporary injunction upon
a hearing -after notice. Such a temporary restraining order shall be
effective for no longer than five days and shall become void at the
expiration of said five days."'
ANN. c. 8, see. 165 (1935); Connecticut, 3 CONN. GEN. STAT. c. 404 sec. 8209
(1949); Florida, 2 FLi. STAT. equity rule 73 (1949); Georgia, 2 GEo. CODE, see.
55-201 (Park 19:35); Idaho, 2 IDAHO CODE ANN. see. 8-403 (1948); Illinois, ILL.
REV. STAT. c. 69, see. 1 (1949); Indiana; 2 IND. STAT. ANiN. sec. 3-2101 (Burns
1933); Kansas, KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. see. 60-1103 (1949); Louisiana, LA. CODE
OF PRAc. ANN. Art. 297 see. 2 (1927); Michigan, except that circuit court com-
1'ssioners have power to grant injunctions to stay proceedings at law, 4 MICH.
,.oMP. LAWS see. 61921 (1948); Minnesota, 2 MunN. STAT. see. 585.03 (1945);
New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr see. 876-a (Thompson 1939); Ohio, 9 Omo GEN.
CODE AiNi. see. 11877 (Page 1938); West Virgima, IV VA. CODE ANN. see. 5344
(1949); Wisconsin, V/is. STAT. sec. 268.02 (1949); United States, Fed. R. 65.
'
2FED. R. Civ. PRtoc. 65 (b) (1948).
' 29 U.S.C. c. 6 (1946).
Id. at 107.
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The inherent vices of the use of injunctive powers without notice
in cases involving labor disputes have thus been recognized by Con-
gress.22 The requirement of oral testimony is a jurisdictional fact,
and cannot be ignored. 23 Suffice it to say there is no comparison be-
tween oral testimony and affidavits or complaints in their relative
capabilities for the task of getting to the truth. Indeed, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act affords protective features which are essential to any
guaranty of truth. Furthermore, the act is fair to all; if the rare
occasion arises where an applicant is in fact deserving of a temporary
restraining order without notice to the other party, there is adequate
opportunity for him to obtain it.
It is believed, therefore, that Kentucky would benefit by adoption
of code provisions similar to those established by Congress pertaning
to the issuance of temporary restraining orders. The courts would
then possess a more accurate guide for the quest of truth by virtue
of requirement of oral testimony in cases involving labor disputes,
thereby minimizing the dangers presented by one sided affidavits.
Moreover, applications for temporary restraining orders in cases other
than labor disputes would be subjected to more diligent scrutiny by
the requirement that the judge make a specific findings of fact which
would be incorporated into the order. Finally, the life of such an
order would be reduced from the existing Kentucky maximum of
twenty days to five in labor cases, ten in the ordinary case. Such pro-
cedural reform of the temporary restraining order would be a bul-
wark of protection to one who is about to be subjected to injunc-
tive restraint without notice.2 4 The rights of one who has not bad an
opportunity to defend should always be jealously guarded by the law
JAms DANmIL CORNETrE
"The obvious purpose of the five day limit was to prevent restraint without
a hearing on the question whether substantial and irreparable injury has been done
to the employer, for so long a time as to effect materially the effort of the striking
employees." Toledo P. & W R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enter-
prise Lodge No. 27, 182 F 2d. 265, 267. (C. C. A. IM. 1943), Revd on other
grounds 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
'See Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
-"Much could be accomplished wihtin the present system by the reform
of procedure, especially by narrowly restricting or abolishing ex parte orders. The
practice of throwing the force of the state on one side of a controversy before
heanng the other is a poor compromise between compulsory arbitration and a
hands off policy." MCCRACKEN, STmix INjuNCTioN IN TrE NEw SouTi 143, 144
(1931).
